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COMMON SENSE ABOUT THE AGE 
OF STATUTES 
Steve Macisaac* 
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES. By Guido Calabresi 
Cam.bridge: Harvard University Press. 1982. Pp. 319. $25. 
''An Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that 
look pretty odd,, ' 
- Holt, C.J., City of London v. Wood, 
88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 
1701) 
Professor Calabresi's book, A (;ommon Law for the Age of Statutes, ten-
tatively formulates a doctrine that he believes will provide some relief for a 
legal system that is - to use his colorful phrase - "choking on statutes" (p. 
1). Actually, "gagging" might be a catchword more appropriate to Cala-
bresi's perception of the problem, because his concern is not with the sheer 
volume of legislation but instead with the unpalatable task that courts face 
when they are forced to apply obsolete or anachronistic statutes. He main-
tains that courts have resorted to a variety of techniques - some valiant, 
some disingenuous, all ultimately ill-advised - to cope with senile statutes, 
and argues that frank recognition of a judicial power to update or force 
legislative "reconsideration" of obsolete statutes is the only appropriate so-
lution. The proposition that courts should actively prod legislators into fac-
ing up to their "majoritarian responsibilities" is decidedly upbeat in an era 
that finds many commentators fretting about how far legislatures can limit 
the courts. 1 As a result, the book is certain to be widely read. Critical re-
sponse is equally certain: Calabresi writes and thinks in grand style, and so 
many of the concepts central to his doctrine are defined vaguely and some 
questions he "does not take too seriously" will be thought by others crucial 
to the doctrine's legitimacy.2 The book is therefore likely to spark a dia-
logue in the legal community, a prelude to what Calabresi hopes will even-
tually be a dialogue between the courts and the legislatures.3 
* B.A. 1978, Wayne State University; J.D. 1982, University of Michigan. Law Clerk to the 
Hon. James L. Oakes, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. - Ed. 
I. See, e.g., Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Limitations 
On Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 
(1981). 
2. See Mikva, The Sh!fting Sands of Legal Topography (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REV. 
534, 534 (1982) (stating that Calabresi's doctrine "patently confuse[s] articles I and III of the 
Constitution"). · 
3. A recent outpouring of reviews already has made something of a start on such a dia-
logue. See Coffin, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 827 (1982); Cox, Book Review, 70 CALIF. L. 
RBv. 1463 (1982); Hurst, Book Review, 67 MINN. L. RBv. 563 (1983); Hutchinson & Morgan, 
Book Review, 82 CoLUM. L. RBv. 1752 (1982); Mikva, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534 
(1982). ' 
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The book opens with a prolegomenon that outlines the parameters of 
the problem, the responses Calabresi believes have failed, and his conclu-
sion that ''we are already doing, badly and in hidden ways, much of what 
this 'radical' doctrine [would] allow[ ]" (p. 7). He identifies "legislative in-
ertia" - the tendency of legislatures to leave old laws intact despite 
changed circumstances that render the original rationale inapposite or the 
statute's operation perverse - as the source of the problem. The result, 
according to Calabresi, is that "getting a statute enacted is much easier than 
getting it revised" (p. 6). He concludes that legislative inertia has upset an 
idealized balance between continuity and change, a duet between the courts 
and legislatures synchronized with the essentially conservative American 
tradition of law revision. The remainder of the book is divided about 
equally between examining and rejecting approaches Calabresi views as 
flawed attempts to recapture this balance, and exploring how a doctrine 
that would allow courts to update statutes could be applied and how it 
would be limited. The section that will be of most interest to many readers 
- the defense of the doctrine's legitimacy - lies between Calabresi's de-
scriptions of what is and what might be. 
I 
Various scholars and jurists have expressed alarm at what the idiot wind 
of time does to statutory law. In addressing this problem Calabresi joins a 
distinguished line of individuals that includes Sir Francis Bacon,4 Roscoe 
Pound,5 Cardozo,6 and, more recently, Judge Henry Friendly7 and Grant 
Gilmore. 8 But those who are not convinced that statutory obsolescence is 
the problem Calabresi thinks it is may be skeptical of his view that courts 
have taken "flight to the constitution" to eliminate statutory deadwood. He 
argues that courts have been tempted, in their desire to treat like cases alike, 
to use an equal protection approach to invalidate old statutes based on ra-
tionales or presumptions that now seem either outdated or constitutionally 
doubtful. The idea is provocative, and his discussion of the few cases he 
sees as illustrative of the trend is interesting, but there may be less here than 
meets the eye. Calabresi may be unusually prescient in spotting a trend, 
but his fear that courts will overextend themselves and thereby endanger 
"core" constitutional rights in their attempts to invalidate old statutes seems 
overdrawn.9 In the absence of a constitutional principle that would distin-
4. F. BACON, An Offer to the King of A .Digest to be Made of the Laws of England, in LAW 
TRACTS 15, 20 (1737) ("The laws of the most kingdoms and states, have been like buildings of 
many pieces, and patched up from time to time according to occasions, without frame or 
model'') 
5. Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SocY. 142 (1920). 
6. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HAR.v. L. R.E.v. 113 (1921). 
7. H. FRIENDLY, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 
reprinted in BENCHMARKS 41 (1967). 
8. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95-97 (1977). 
9. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concuning) ("[I]nvocation of the equal protection clause [as opposed to the due process clause] 
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely 
means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact."); Mikva, supra note 2, 
at 537. But see Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. R.E.v. 537, 587-92 (1982). 
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guish between statutes on the basis of age alone, 10 it is unclear that the 
contours of "current" constitutional doctrine are likely to be distorted by 
the tug of old statutes on the judicial conscience. Certainly the cases re-
jecting constitutional challenges to recent legislation shielding select groups 
from tort liability do not support such a thesis. 11 
Calabresi also rejects the possibility of remedying obsolescence through 
the use of doctrines that, following Bickel, 12 he lumps under the rubric of 
"passive virtues." His primary argument here is that the techniques Bickel 
championed would lose their "true meaning" if they were used to force 
legislative reconsideration of statutes that, although obsolete, present no 
constitutional difficulty. Cynics, of course, might question what would be 
lost by "abusing" a doctrine like delegation of powers that is, at least at the 
federal level, virtually a dead letter.13 One also wonders whether other ap-
10. Calabresi hints at such a principle, but does not develop it: 
The notion is that there may be some issues as to which the very structure of our govern-
ment, or the requirement of a republican form of government, or concepts of due process 
and equal protection, demand a current answer by, a relatively majoritarian body al-
though there may be no constitutional requirement as to what the answer must be. 
P. 266 n.99. 
11. A number of states passed statutes in the 1970s in an attempt to slow the increase in 
health care costs generally attributed to large malpractice awards. Typically, these statutes 
required would-be plaintiffs to submit their claims first to arbitration panels - thus giving rise 
to right-to-jury challenges - and some of them imposed an upper limit on the amount that 
plaintiffs could recover. These statutes have generally been upheld. See, e.g., Eastin v. 
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); 
Maryland v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274,385 A.2d 51,appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Paro v. 
Longwood Hospital, 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 
97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct, 
1976); Parker v. Children's Hospital, 394 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1978); Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 
491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). 
At least two cases have struck down legislation limiting recoveries in medical malpractice 
suits. In Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Assn., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976), the 
Illinois Supreme Court found such a limitation violative of a state constitutional provision 
prohibiting "special laws." 63 Ill. 2d at 329-30, 347 N.E.2d. at 743. Similarly, in Arneson v. 
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) the North Dakota Supreme Court struck down a recovery 
limitation on state as well as federal equal protection grounds. The court noted that in enact-
ing the statute the legislature had relied on national malpractice insurance rates and concluded 
that "either the Legislature was misinformed or subsequent events [lower insurance rates] have 
changed the situation substantially." 270 N.W.2d at 136. As might be expected, these deci-
sions have been criticized. See, e.g., Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 428-29 
(N.D. Ind. 1979) (Wright andArneson "severely criticized and rejected by courts and commen• 
tators," referring to jury trial denial claim), '!ffd., 603 F.2d 646 (1979); Prendergrast v. Nelson, 
199 Neb. 97,107,256 N.W.2d 657,665 (1977) (Wright not persuasive), Cj'. Redish,Legislative 
Response to the the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 
TEXAS L. REV. 759, 782 (1977) (concluding that courts should not frustrate "social legislation 
developed by representative legislative bodies . . . by judicial speculation"). 
12. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term -Foreword.· The Passive Virtues, 15 HARV. L. 
REV. 40 (1961). 
13. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 3.1, at 149-50 (1978) ("Since 1935 the 
nondelegation doctrine has had no reality in the holdings, although remnants of the doctrine 
persist in judicial verbiage."); see also T. LoWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); 
Bensel, Creating the Statutory Stale: The lmplicalions of a Rule of Law Standard in American 
Politics, 14 AMER. PoL. Sci. REv. 734 (1980) (suggesting what criteria statutes should conform 
to in order to satisfy "rule of law" standard); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L:REv. 263, 288-90 (1982) (advancing an economic 
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proaches he canvasses - void for vagueness, a modern day version of ces-
sante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, and desuetude - could not, if taken 
together and applied creatively, provide a reasonably effective means of ad-
dressing obsolescence.14 But he rejects all of these possibilities as either 
overinclusive or underinclusive, or both, or because they fail to focus on 
what he views as the critical question: whether an anachronistic statute en-
joys current support. Vagueness fails because "[m]any anachronistic stat-
utes are clear as can be" (p. 25), desuetude fails because "[m]any old laws 
that are out of phase and would not be reenacted are still enforced" (p. 21), 
and the cessante ratione legis rationale would produce invalidation where 
new rationales would support the law, and might not produce invalidation 
where, although the old rationale is "plausibl[e]," it is "out of tune with the 
total law" (p. 23). 
The third and final judicial response that Calabresi rejects is the one 
most readers might suspect is the most efficacious - statutory interpreta-
tion. Briefly, he argues that the range of discretion courts can properly ex-
ercise in interpreting a statute prevents them from addressing the 
obsolescence problem squarely: ''The limits of honest interpretation are too 
constricting, whereas the scope and dangers of unlimited interpretation are 
too broad" (p. 38). Surely this is correct, at least in those cases where a 
statute simply and unequivocally commands the courts to apply a particular 
decision rule - e.g., contributory negligence bars recovery - in specific 
cases. How many statutes fall into this category is another question. Many 
statutes - perhaps most statutes - are vague enough to allow courts to 
keep them current without doing damage to the "core of honest interpreta-
tion." In the hands of inventive judges, the reach of interpretation would 
seem broad indeed.15 Conversely, the "dangers of unlimited interpreta-
tion" are not themselves unlimited; the same limit that Calabresi argues 
would check an inappropriate use of his doctrine - legislative reversal of 
judicial decisions - certainly checks ''unlimited interpretation." 
Calabresi then explores whether the ''New Deal Response" - delega-
justification for delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies). But see Industrial 
Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring 
in the judgment on nondelegation grounds). 
14. See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 536 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding a particular 
transaction to be outside the definition of "purchase" under § 16(b) of the Securities Act. 
"When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases [to operate] .... Since the purposes 
of the Act are stated clearly and appear side-by-side with the literal demands [it is appropriate] 
to determine on an ad hoc basis whether the purposes of the Act are in any way being served 
by an application of the literal provisions."), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). 
15. An obvious example is the River and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 403, 407,411 (1976). See w. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 4.5, at 387 (1977) (Water 
pollution regulation is "influenced importantly by the humble specifics of a nineteenth-century 
statute that is almost an insult to the sophisticated wastes of modem technology. It has served 
nonetheless as a remarkably flexible deterrent to water pollution of every conceivable manner, 
shape and form."). The Sherman Act is another example of a statute that has retained its 
vitality despite its age. For an example of a pinched and hidebound approach to statutory 
interpretation in a case involving a state counterpart of the Sherman Act, see State v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 344 N.E.2d 357, 381 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (1976) (rejecting the 
argument that the term "arrangement" covers a price discrimination practice in the absence of 
"a reciprocal relationship of commitment between two or more legal or economic entities," 
despite indications that state statute's scope was intended to be broader than the Sherman Act). 
758 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 81:754 
tion of broad policy mandates to administrative agencies-is likely to offer 
a solution. He concludes that, as agents of change, administrative agencies 
have been "a dismal disappointment" (p. 45). Although he is quick to cau-
tion the reader at several points that the conventional wisdom about how 
and why bureaucrats "satisfice"16 is simplistic and sometimes misleading, 
most of this section does little more than summarize that wisdom. But there 
is a shift in emphasis here. Calabresi's assessment of the possibility that 
agencies can tackle the problem of obsolescence necessarily entails a com-
parison: If courts suffer from the same problems that plague agencies they 
are unlikely to be any better at solving the problem. His definition of an 
obsolete statute - a statute that does not "fit" the legal topography and 
lacks current legislative support - guides the comparison. 
He concludes that, on balance, agencies are less likely than courts to be 
able to discern lack of "fit" or gauge current support. Agencies cannot spot 
lack of fit because they are either too closely involved with their own statute 
or insufficiently familiar with the rest of the legal landscape. Somewhat 
paradoxically, it is precisely because they are politically accountable that 
their reading of majority wishes is, in Calabresi's view, suspect: "Political 
accountability leads almost inevitably to an overblown faith in one's capac-
ity to know what the majority wants, and hence to a tendency to emphasize 
this aspect of lawmaking to the detriment of consistency" (p. 53). Courts, 
on the other hand, are trained to interpret the legal topography and are, by 
virtue of their relative insulation from the play of day-to-day politics, better 
able to follow it: "Strange to say, an elected court is more independent, less 
subject to the force and whim of particular legislators and executives, than 
even regulators on long-term appointments" (p. 53). At this point, readers 
will probably feel that the case for courts and against agencies is made out a 
little unfairly; it seems that courts are given the benefit of every doubt, 
while many recent developments that promise to promote agency accounta-
bility and efficiency are treated, if at all, only in footnotes.17 
Calabresi then dismisses in rapid succession sunset laws, law revision 
commissions, and efforts to make lawmaking more representative through 
either reform of the legislative process itself or more frequent resort to di-
rect lawmaking. Sunset laws are too mechanical and are likely to degener-
ate into a mere formality; law revision commissions steer clear of 
controversial issues; structural reform of the legislative process "would real-
locate power and make law revision too easy" (p. 71); the initiative and 
referendum processes are dismissed as posing "dangers ... [that] form a 
commonplace part of the literature" (p. 70). 
His confidence in dismissing all of these alternatives as inadequate is 
striking. Although sunset laws are a relatively recent phenomenon, Cala-
16. See Simon,A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. EcoN. 99 (1955). 
17. See, e.g., Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 
(1975) (arguing that presidential control over independent agencies should be increased, sub-
ject to a one-house congressional veto). Presidential control over the rulemaking of executive 
agencies has been effected by Executive Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), but independent 
agencies remain free from such oversighL The constitutionality of a one-house veto is cur-
rently before the Supreme Court in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 51 
U.S.L.W. 3453 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1982) (reargument) (No. 80-1832). 
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bresi concludes that sunsetting will "defeat itself' (p. 61). 18 He relies on 
dated support for his assertion that law revision commissions avoid making 
controversial recommendations, and ignores other evidence that tends to 
contradict this assertion (pp. 62-63). 19 Structural reform of the legislative 
process is dismissed as out of keeping with an ideal construct of the legisla-
tive/judicial balance despite the wide variance in state legislative structures 
and despite evidence indicating that states are pursuing reform efforts to 
streamline the legislative process.2° Finally, the resurgence of direct legisla-
18. Certainly the state legislatures are not as pessimistic about the sunset approach as Cal-
abresi - some forty-four states have enacted sunset legislation of one sort or another. See 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1982-83 BOOK OF THE STATES 228-31 (fable #27, Sum-
mary of Sunset Legislation). For an example of a particularly ambitious sunset statute, see 
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 11.61 (West Supp. 1982, at 105-12) (listing over 3,000 statutory provisions 
that are to be phased out absent legislative action between 1982 and 1991). The Florida statute 
avoids one of the primary faults Calabresi finds with sunset statutes - the possibility of a 
statute being "bottled up" in committee - by providing that "each appropriate subcommittee 
shall begin a review . . . 15 months prior to the date set for repeal . . . and shall make a 
recommendation . . . for continuation, modification or repeal of the program or function 
•.•. " FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 11.61(3) (West Supp. 1982). The most dramatic effect of the Flor-
ida legislation to date has been the deregulation of the trucking industry, see Deffenbaugh & 
Hayman, Motor Carrier .Deregulation in Florida: Before, .During and After, 8 FLA. ST. L. R.Ev. 
681 (1980). Trucking interests challenged the statute's operation on various constitutional 
grounds, but the deregulation was upheld. See Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. State, 405 So. 
2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding repeal of motor carrier regulation pursuant to 
sunset act against constitutional challenges based on contract clause, fair notice and court ac-
cess grounds). 
19. See, e.g., Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1980, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1597, 
1613 (McKinney) (urging elimination of "impermissible sex distinctions with respect to the 
obligations of parents to support their children and husbands and wives to support each 
other"); Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1981, 1981 N.Y. Laws 2235, 2336 (Mc-
Kinney) (urging amendment or repeal of thirty-one state statutes ''which discriminate, in a 
constitutionally impermissible manner, against aliens who have been lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the U.S. under federal immigration laws"). See also Abrams, New 
York!!- Legislature Tries Harder, 46 STATE GOVT. 256, 258 (1973) (establishment of Task Force 
on Critical Problems aimed at "focus[ing] on key issue areas that need long-range assault, such 
as reducing welfare costs or providing universal health insurance. The evolution of this office 
will be watched carefully by legislators around the country for its implications as an "inspector 
general" type function in the . . . P]egislature, or it may evolve into a new type of program 
dev,~lopment agency."). 
20. Although the committee system is well established in state legislatures, recent research 
suggests that its importance varies significantly from state to state. See Francies & Riddles-
perger, U.S. State Legislative Committees: Structure, Procedural Efficiency, and Party Control, 
7 LEGJS. STUD. Q. 453 (1982) (fable 3, "Committee Centrality Scores by State and Chamber" 
indicating "rather sharp differences in committee importance among the 99 legislative cham-
bers"). Few states use subcommittees extensively, see M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEG-
ISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 203 (1977), and this is one area where it is hoped 
reform efforts might bear fruit. For a study that concludes that a change in committee struc-
ture will not necessarily lead to greater legislative efficiency - efficiency being measured by 
the congruence between committee recommendations and full floor votes - see Hamm & 
Montcrief, Effects of Structural Change In Legislative Committee Systems on their Performance 
in U.S. States, 7 LEGIS STUD. Q. 383 (1982). Calabresi, along with many other observers, 
views the committee system as largely responsible for the dysfunction of the legislative process, 
see generally Brenner, Congressional Reform: Analyzing the Analysts, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGJS. 
651, 664-70 (1977), and so he gives little attention to structural and procedural reforms aimed 
at dovetailing the committee system with the larger legislative process. Legislators, on the 
other hand, understand that the committee system is inevitable, given the volume and com-
plexity of legislation, and accordingly view the proper purpose of reform as strengthening the 
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tion spanning an issue spectrum ranging from nuclear disarmament to den-
turism is barely considered.21 And Calabresi never explains why the 
legislative reconsiderations his doctrine would induce would not also be 
bottled up in committee, receive greater attention than issues considered by 
law revision commissions or "blue-ribbon" committees that work closely 
with the legislature, 22 or simply fall victim to the same structural obstacles 
all legislation confronts. 
All of these objections, of course, are little more than nit-picking. Cala-
bresi's thesis obviously does not depend on the utter absence of workable 
judicial, administrative or legislative responses to the problem of obsoles-
cence. Nor is it necessary for him to prove that his doctrine is the most 
attractive approach. It is enough if the doctrine merely contributes to a 
solution. Why then does he categorically reject all of these alternatives as 
insufficient? One suspects that Calabresi's approach is rhetorically one-
sided for two reasons. First, he is attempting to convince readers - many 
of whom are likely to be skeptical23 - that statutory obsolescence is a prob-
lem. Second, Calabresi states at several points in the book that his intention 
is to offer only a tentative formulation of the doctrine, a formulation he 
hopes will prompt reaction and discussion. In devoting the first half of the 
book to rejecting what he perceives to be unwitting or misguided attempts 
to keep statutory law current, he has elevated the level of discussion by 
setting the standards against which his proposal will be evaluated. But how 
does his doctrine work? 
committee system to facilitate the flow of legislation, see Montcrief & Jewell, Legislator's Per• 
ceplions of Reform in Three Stales, 8 AMER. PoL. Q. 106, 116-18 (1980). 
21. See generally REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY (D. 
Butler & A. Raney eds. 1978). Calabresi should have spent more time addressing the direct 
legislation process as an alternative, if only because the small show of support necessary to 
lodge a question on the ballot- in California, for example, well under 5% of the voting public 
can force reconsideration of a statute, id. at 92 - seems to cast doubt on his assumptions 
concerning "majority sentiment" and failure of the legislative process. There are, of course, 
analysts who suggest that direct legislation suffers from the same problems that beset the con• 
ventional legislative process, see, e.g., Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the lnilialive: Cor• 
porale Control of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and Whal lo do About ii, 32 
FED. COM. LJ. 315, 319-20 (1980), but the returns so far seem to indicate that corporate and 
other "special interests" groups have been unsuccessful in their attempts to use the initiative or 
referendum to "buy" legislation. Compare Calabresi's offhanded dismissal of direct legisla-
tion with the conclusions of those who have studied the process more thoroughly. See, e.g., 
Bone & Benedict, Perspectives on .Direct Legislation: Washington Slate's Experience 1914-1973, 
28 W. POL. Q. 330, 349 (1975) (concluding that direct legislation has been successful as an 
alternative to the legislative political process); Price, The Initiative: A Comparative Stale Analy• 
sis and Reassessment of a Western Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243, 261-62 (1975) (''The initia-
tive does provide a last resort to the public to bypass a recalcitrant legislature and/or 
governor. . . . Clearly, initiatives do allow for decisive decisions on particularly sensitive, 
hard to resolve, issues."). 
22. See, e.g., Ratchford, Red-Letter Achievements from Blue Ribbon Panels, 51 STATE 
GOVT. 59, 59 (1979) (lamenting the fact that valuable reports of panels assigned to study vari-
ous problems meriting legislative attention often "gather dust and the scorecard is poor for 
having recommendations translated into law and meaningful programs" and documenting the 
successful efforts of a blue-ribbon panel in Connecticut charged with studying the nursing 
home industry). 
23. See Coffin, supra note 3, at 837. 
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II 
Calabresi defines an obsolete statute as one which (1) no longer fits the 
legal topography and (2) lacks current legislative support. Courts using his 
doctrine would be on the lookout for statutes that "not only could not be 
reenacted but also do not fit, are in some sense inconsistent with, our whole 
legal landscape" (p. 2). The centerpiece of Calabresi's doctrine, then, is the 
notion of a "legal fabric, topography, or landscape" (p. 51). 
Ultimately, Calabresi believes it is appropriate to grant courts the power 
to call old statutes due because courts are better than other political actors 
at the "rational application oflegal principles" (p. 96).24 It is therefore rea-
sonable to ask whether the central principle of his doctrine, the notion of a 
legal topography, is capable of consistent, rational application. If courts are 
not capable of applying the concept consistently, the essential justification 
for exercising the power Calabresi would grant them is undercut. This is 
not merely an analytic nicety. As long as courts can agree on the principles 
they apply, decisions in individual cases that are inconsistent with those 
principles or simply wrongly decided work only limited damage. But the 
danger of inconsistent application of a concept that would "induce" or 
"force" a legislative reconsideration is much greater, both because of the 
number of individuals affected and the likelihood that legislators will re-
24. Calabresi's perspective on the legitimacy question is functional. He states that 
the skills the court would be called on to use . . . remain judicial skills, and hence the 
legitimacy of their exercise remains the same as the co=on law. The power is legitimate 
because it results from the use of special judicial skills - analysis of the legal topography 
- and because employment of these skills tends, albeit indirectly and imprecisely, to 
adjust the law to deep majoritarian wishes. 
P. 108. Compressed a little, Calabresi's argument is that courts can legitimately do whatever it 
is they are capable of doing as courts, because they are courts. Whether the arguments made 
for judicial intervention where failure of the legislative process threatens individual rights or 
the validity of the process itself from a participational perspective, see generally J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), possess the same force when applied to mundane, workaday 
statutes is another question. Although Calabresi argues at length that adoption of his doctrine 
would not require courts to perform functions different from those performed at co=on law, 
his scheme surely represents a radical departure from existing practice. His reliance on a 
purely functional as opposed to a normative justification for the doctrine leaves him open, of 
course, to criticism from a functional as well as a normative perspective. Readers who believe 
that the judiciary should be limited to interstitial lawmaking because it is simply not "repre-
sentative" will probably reject the doctrine on normative grounds, without regard to snazzy 
functional arguments. For them, Calabresi's legitimacy arguments will fail because they never 
progress beyond arguments of competency to address questions of political theory. See gener-
ally Dahrendorf, Effectiveness and Legitimacy: On the Govemability of Democracies, 51 PoL. 
Q. 393, 396 (1980) ("Effectiveness is a technical concept. It simply means that governments 
have to be able to do things which they claim they can do, as well as those which they are 
expected to do; they have to work. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is a moral concept. . . . 
This takes us straight into the confusions of moral philosophy, of course."); Grafstein, The 
Failure of Weber's Conception of Legitimacy . •. Its Causes and Implications, 43 J. PoL. 456 
(1981). Readers who equate competency with legitimacy will still have to evaluate the doctrine 
in terms of the plausibility of the claims Calabresi makes about the judiciary's ability to follow 
the "topography" and plumb majority sentiment. 
Calabresi, of course, must reject the traditional wisdom that statutes are to be revered be-
cause they have been left undisturbed (p. 102). See J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 135 
(Penguin Books ed. 1968) (''Why then do ancient laws co=and so much respect? Precisely 
because they are ancient. We must believe that it is only the excellence of such laws that has 
enabled them to last so long; if the sovereign had not continually recognized them as salutary, 
they would have been revoked a thousand times."). 
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spond to ''wrong" decisions by attacking the doctrine directly rather than 
by merely "correcting" courts.25 
The legal topography would include common-law decisions, statutes, 
administrative determinations, jury verdicts, enforcement patterns, schol-
arly criticism - in short, just about everything except the legislator's mail 
bag. But he offers no more than an enumerative definition of the topogra-
phy; he lists virtually every conceivable landmark that might be found on 
an all-encompassing legal landscape26 but provides no roadmap or compass 
to guide courts in their journey. Readers will have to judge for themselves 
whether Calabresi's topography is comprehensive and coherent enough to 
guide a judicial decision to induce legislative reconsideration and make that 
decision appear to a legislature to be a principled one. He anticipates the 
criticism that, as defined, his topography is "a confused landscape . . . a 
ragged map" (p. 99). His only response is a demure reminder that "limits 
as a practical matter remain" (p. 100).27 One's willingness to embrace Cal-
abresi's doctrine will probably depend on one's perception of where those 
limits might lie. 
For Calabresi, the topography is both a comparative and a normative 
reference point. He would use it comparatively, as a sort of template, to 
gauge how far out of line a statute is with existing legal practice. Thus, 
workman's compensation laws or wrongful death statutes that limit the 
amount, or against whom, plaintiffs may recover might be inconsistent with 
25. The risk of legislative repudiation of the doctrine is reduced somewhat by limiting the 
doctrine's use to the highest court of a jurisdiction and by imposing a "comity" limitation, 
Although Calabresi feels that an explicit delegation from the legislature would be desirable, he 
believes that this is not necessary. Whether the existence of law revision commissions or 
standing committees charged with performing the same function courts would perform under 
Calabresi's doctrine amounts to a negation of the discretion he feels courts have to adopt the 
doctrine without explicit delegation is nowhere considered. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§§ 4.311-4.327, 4.324 (1979) [Legislative Council Act] ("The law revision commission shall 
... [e]xamine the common law and statutes of the state ... for the purpose of discovering 
defects and anachronisms in the law . . . [, and] recommend . . . such changes in the law . , . 
necessary in order to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules oflaw, and to bring 
the law of this state ... into harmony with modem conditions."). 
26. Narrower, more precise definitions of topography are possible. Both Ronald Dworkin 
and George Christie have defended modelling the system of precedent as a set of data points; 
the judge's mission is to find the best fit among them. Both these theorists, however, confine 
the data points to cases, statutes, and constitutional provisions, the traditional elements of 
positive law. See generally G. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY (1982); note 31 infta. 
27. The footnote supporting this statment refers to "outside boundaries" that prevent 
judges from "decid[ing] cases as they would were they legislators or even disinterested guardi-
ans" (p. 256 n.37), without suggesting the limits of these boundaries. Ultimately, one must take 
comfort in the consolation that "(o]ne judge's views would win out only if enough other judges 
either found that they conformed to the legal landscape or, finding no adequate guidelines in 
the landscape, still shared the judge's guess of what the majority wanted or of what was right 
for the country." P. 100. The latter factor sounds a lot like what legislators are supposed to do. 
The first factor - consistency with the legal landscape - reformulates at a fairly high level of 
abstraction that characteristic of adjudication upon which legitimacy is generally premised -
reasoned elaboration of a result from generally agreed upon premises. See R. POUND, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW I 16 (1922); Friedrich,Aulhorilj', Reason, and ,[)/s-
ere/ion, in NoMos I: AUTHORITY 28 (C. Friedrich ed. 1958). Whether the "topography" is 
clear and stable enough to function as such a premise is questionable; it seems more likely that 
each obsolescence determination will be largely sui generis, particularly in cases where a stat-
ute has preempted large portions of common law. 
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tort law developments allowing recovery without regard to fault or the 
plaintiffs relationship to the defendant. Calabresi believes that using the 
topography comparatively is justified because the topgraphy also represents 
a normative datum or "starting" point: He argues that the topography 
fairly accurately "reflect[s] the underlying desires of a society as these have 
evolved" (p. 97). 
Those who believe that judges inevitably indulge their own values re-
gardless of the ordering principles they purport to rely on will probably 
dismiss the concept of a topography as an atavism of the formalist's theory 
of jurisprudence.28 Even those who concede that judges cannot shed their 
values when they don their robes, but nevertheless welcome the 
countermajoritarian influence of judges as "disinterested generalists"29 
might question whether the topography can, as a practical matter, be ap-
plied.30 It bristles with so many varied elements that it is difficult to be 
optimistic about the possibility of systematically defining its contours. As-
suming that one is prepared to accept that there is a topography - an "out 
there" that can be discussed meaningfully - there is little in Calabresi's 
description ofit to indicate any ordering principles.31 Thus, should the re-
search suggesting that jury selection procedures result in unrepresentative 
28. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1982). Ac-
cording to Unger, formalism supposes an 
immanent moral rationality whose message [can] be articulated by a single cohesive the-
ory. This daring and implausible sanctification of the actual is in fact undertaken by the 
dominant legal theories and tacitly presupposed by the unreflective common sense of or-
thodox lawyers. Most often, the sanctification takes the form of treating the legal order as 
a repository of intelligible purposes, policies, and principles, in abrupt contrast to the stan-
dard disenchanted view of legislative policies. 
Unger, mpra, at 571 (emphasis added). 
29. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 486, 493 (1982). See M. 
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 102 (1982) (arguing that in 
cases involving individual rights "the politically insulated federal judiciary is more likely, 
when the human rights issue is a deeply controversial one, to move us in the direction of a 
right answer • . . than is the political process left to its own devices"). 
30. This is not to say, however, that there is no support for the notion that judges can 
accurately apprehend the legal topography. Dworkin's theory of judicial mistakes turns on 
just such perceptions of the legal landscape; a precedent should be overruled, he argues, when-
ever the best justification for the entire legal system is stronger after overruling a decision than 
it would otherwise be. Dworkin applies this reasoning in two forms; a case or statute now 
simply inconsistent with the legal topography, but not fundamentally unfair, retains its specific 
authority but loses its gravitational force. That is, the principles of the old decision will not be 
extended in the decision of new cases, but situations precisely within the facts of the prior 
holding will still be resolved accordingly. Where fundamental fairness is at stake, Dworkin 
deems the inherent costs of overruling justified by eliminating the precedent complained of. 
See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110-23 (1978). 
Interestingly, Dworkin does not go so far as Calabresi in repudiating statutes that are in-
consistent with the legal topography. Hercules' ''theory of legislative supremacy . . . will in-
sure that any statutes he treats as mistakes will lose their gravitational force but not their 
specific authority." R. DWORKIN, mpra at 122. But the comprehension of the legal topogra-
phy involved in evaluating cases and statutes is of course the same. Those persuaded by 
Dworkin's account of precedent should not object to Calabresi's reliance on judicial percep-
tions of the legal topography. 
31. Absent such principles, the value of Calabresi's contribution seems problematic: The 
topography is all content and no form, and therefore largely useless no matter how accurately 
it might be mapped. See M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 139-40 (1962) (striving for 
"universal knowledge" of a world composed of "exactly determined particulars . • . is mis-
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juries32 temper a judge's evaluation of their place on the topography? 
Should the prominence of a trend of common law decisionmaking in tort 
cases depend on whether a judge accepts Horwitz's, Posner's, or Schwartz's 
interpretation of the trend?33 Are the determinations of an independent 
agency to be given greater weight than those of, say, the NLRB, on the 
theory that they are less subject to factious influence? Or vice versa? 
Calabresi of course recognizes that these difficulties are, so to speak, 
part of the territory. He concedes that courts will sometimes err, and is 
careful to emphasize throughout the book that a judicial determination of 
obsolescence is "conditional" because it is subject to legislative reversal. He 
notes that in applying the topography courts will occasionally "ignore it 
... follow the election returns or their own values," but concludes that 
"these values, and their guesses on majority wishes, are not all that bad" (p. 
101). Legislators, of course, feel the same way about their "values" and 
"guesses on majority wishes," and this suggests that the real question is 
whether legislatures are likely to be persuaded that courts, in employing the 
doctrine, would be doing something more than substituting their own val-
ues and assumptions for those that animated an old statute. The efficacy of 
the various "second look" doctrines Bickel urged probably derives from the 
context of their use - in cases that might be dubbed subconstitutional. But 
Calabresi's doctrine is not necessarily limited to statutes that, as he puts it, 
skate close to the constitutional line. Whether legislatures are likely to 
"view [an] issue soberly" (p. 26) on the basis of a finding that a statute does 
not fit a topography that only a court can chart, or that different courts 
chart differently, is the critical question. Legislatures that balk at honoring 
decisions that turn on constitutional "penumbras" are likely to be equally 
suspicious of such "topographical" holdings.34 
Suppose, however, that Calabresi's faith in the ability of judges to dis-
cern and follow the topography in a reasonably consistent fashion is by-
and-large well-placed. The examples he draws on - a guest statute 
floundering in the wake of common-law developments, a statutory compar-
ative negligence gloss that the common law bypassed, and others - suggest 
that in many cases the topography will be manageable because most of it 
will be irrelevant. But this is only half the battle: Even if a statute snags the 
taken, since it substitutes for the subjects in which we are interested a set of data which tell us 
nothing that we want to know''). 
32. See, e.g., Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An 
Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
33. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 67-108 (1977) (tort doc-
trine effected subsidy to developing industries); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEOAL 
STUD. 29 (1972) (tort doctrine accords with notions of economic efficiency); Schwartz, Tort 
Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: a Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 
1774 (1981) (concluding that tort doctrine evinced concern for victims). 
34. Consider, for example, the proposed amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution 
which would extend the legislature's authority over abortion laws to the "outer limits" of con-
stitutional doctrine: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall prevent the General Court from regulating or prohibit-
ing abortion unless prohibited by the United States Constitution, nor shall anythin& in 
this Constitution require public or private funding of abortion, or the provision of services 
or facilities therefor, beyond that required by the United States Constitution. 
Massachusetts Senate Journal, Jan. 3, 1983, at 1375 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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legal fabric, a judge must still determine whether the statute would be reen-
acted, whether it enjoys current legislative support. 
Calabresi admits that "if the object were . . . to pick a body that could 
discern the current majority's wishes . . . we almost surely would not pick 
judges for the task" (p. 100),35 but he argues that in deciding whether a 
statute is "no longer desired by a current majority," courts would be exer-
cising a judgmental function analogous to the one they exercised at com-
mon law (p. 112). He observes that "[i]ncreasingly . . . it seems that courts 
are relying on their sense of what the majority wants to define .the outward 
boundaries of their lawmaking," and concludes that as long as· courts first 
"look to the landscape" to ascertain lack of fit, because this "refl.ect[s] a 
deeper popular will," the "guess, increasingly made at common law, as to 
majoritarian wishes will inevitably be made" (p. 113). Thus Calabresi com-
pletes the circle, tying the legitimacy of deciding when a statute lacks cur-
rent support to the topography as an alembic for deep majoritarian wishes. 
Bringing statutes into conformity with the topography therefore partakes of 
the same legitimacy as common-law decisionmaking. 
Unfortunately, the circle has been completed at a level of generality and 
abstraction that is miles above the nitty gritty of legislative politics. One 
therefore wonders if the "majority support" component of the obsolescence 
inquiry can really assist courts in deciding whether there is current legisla-
tive support for a statute, or whether, instead, courts would be operating as 
reversible Councils of Revision. In this connection, some readers might 
question in just what sense Calabresi is arguing that courts are capable of 
discerning majority wishes. Early in the book, in a footnote, he promises 
that he will use "majoritarian" in a "rather special sense"; he defines 
"majoritarian preference" to mean ''whatever a current representative legis-
lature would decide on a question to which it gives its full consideration" 
(p. 186 n.13). But the passages quoted above, with one exception, all seem 
to stand for the proposition that courts, when confronted with what are 
essentially policy choices, will often decide a question with reference to 
what they believe to be prevailing public sentiment, on the theory that this 
is likely to maximize utility or, at the least, minimize the antidemocratic 
consequences of judicial review. There is a world of difference between this 
inquiry and one which asks whether a legislature would reenact a particular 
statute unchanged or how the statute might be modified. The latter inquiry 
35. Happily, Calabresi does not harangue the reader with an extended addition to the 
"courts are more democratic than . . ." debate. His doctrine straddles the uncertain line be-
tween article I and article III and his approach is accordingly fully comparative. The elo-
quence with which he frames the inquiry makes it dangerous not to quote him at length: 
Not so readily resolved is the question of whether skill at discerning current popular sup-
port, capacity to anyalyze and follow the legal topography, or endowment with a trust-
worthy sense of values is most important in the updating of timeworn laws. 
The decision must depend, in part, on how common are the situations that are well 
handled by each approach. It must also depend on how poorly each approach would deal 
with those situations it is not best suited to handle. . . . Ideally, the task of deciding 
when the burden of inertia should be shifted would be placed on a body that has all three 
qualities. 
Such a body is not available. . . . Courts do, however, have an advantage over alter-
native institutions. They are not clearly unsuited to the tasks at which they are not partic-
ularly good. 
Pp. 110-11. 
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would involve courts in analyzing committee politics, interest group posi-
tions, whether there have been any efforts to change the statute in the past 
and why those efforts have failed, etc.,-in short, a review of the complexi-
ties of the legislative process, preferably from the perspective of those inter-
ests associated with the specific issues the statute reflects.36 
The potential for rather wide divergence between a court's perception of 
majority sentiments and the majoritarian forces actually operative in the 
legislative arena suggests that, in all but the simplest of cases, the former is 
unlikely to be a useful surrogate for the latter. The majority sentiment 
prong of the obsolescence test appears to be mere window dressing, 
designed to appease those who would reject the proposition that courts 
should be able to force legislative reconsideration of a statute whenever it 
does not fit the topography. But how ~an the doctrine amount to anything 
more than this if the courts rely on a notion of majority sentiment that 
ignores the vagaries and distortions of the legislative process itself? Cala-
bresi's answer to this is that a court's perception of majority sentiment is 
adequate to serve as a starting point. From this starting point, the argument 
goes, legislative reconsideration can proceed and the reconsidered statute 
will at least be the product of a more recent majoritarian decisionmaking 
process, and it might even fit the legal topography better. 
The first point is true, but trivial. It is true because whenever a legisla-
ture reconsiders a statute the outcome is by hypothesis a "majoritarian" 
36. Clearly, courts are not capable of undertaking the "majoritarian" analysis necessary to 
decide whether a particular legislative committee or legislature would countenance a statute's 
current lack of "fit" with the legal topography. They are not privy to the information needed 
for such an analysis, and the intricacy and uncertainty of the legislative process would reduce 
such an effort to a guessing game. Accepting Calabresi's premise that judicial review of the 
common-law variety is legitimate because courts are in some way restrained by majority 
wishes does not lead one smoothly to the conclusion that courts are also capable of deciding 
when a statute is no longer desired by a legislative majority; this transmutes what is most often 
offered as an apology for judicial review into a positive virtue. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 15 (1958); Cooper, Mr. Justice Hugo L Black: Footnotes to a Great Case, 24 ALA. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1971). 
If one adheres to the view that there is often no real majority sentiment on most issues, but 
only an ongoing tussle between constituencies that is occasionally settled by legislation, the 
proposition that courts can discern majority sentiments better than legislators on such issues 
seems weak indeed. The judicial assessment of majority wishes therefore seems to add very 
little one way or the other to the doctrine, at least in cases involving statutes that are more 
complicated than the straightforward, single-issue affairs that Calabresi uses as his primary 
examples. Guest statutes, contributory negligence statutes and statutes that limit wrongful 
death recoveries present attractive cases for arguing that courts can assess majority sentiment 
because the issues are simple and preferences can be easily hypothesized since they divide 
neatly into obvious categories. It is difficult to believe that, for more complicated statutes, the 
majority sentiment prong of the obsolescence inquiry can lead to determinate answers. If a 
statute involves several issues with respect to which individual rank order preferences among 
individuals may vary, or with respect to which the rank order preference of a single individual 
may vary, depending on what preferences will be honored, it is essentially meaningless to 
speak of a single, identifiable "majority preference." See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); A. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM, THE PARADOX OF 
SocJAL CHOICE (1980). And of course courts cannot take account of the various interests 
extrinsic to any single piece of legislation that inevitably engender compromise and trade-off 
in the actual legislative process. There may be some Burkean merit to considering single stat-
utes in a rarified manner, but it is difficult to conclude that this comports with traditional 
modes of assessing majority preference. 
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one. It is trivial because it tells us nothing about whether a court was "cor-
rect'' in remanding the statute. Whenever a legislature does anything more 
than pass a pro fonna resolution indicating that a statute stands, warts and 
all, the new statute will almost always differ from the old one, if only be-
cause the legislative environment - the coalitions that form around the 
legislation, the logrolling, the vote trading, etc., - shifts from one session to 
the next. Thus, if the remand is taken seriously, le., if the issue is tossed 
back into the legislative hopper, the law probably will not resurface in pre-
cisely the same form. If this is the criterion for deciding whether the guess 
as to majority sentiments was correct, courts will rarely be demonstrably 
wrong. Why a new pluralist mishmash is better than an old one, however, 
is unclear, unless we have some reason to suspect that in addition to being 
newer the revised statute will have something else to offer. That "some-
thing else," of course, must be derived from the reasons that caused a court 
to send the statute back in the first place if Calabresi's doctrine is to have 
any internal validity. 
The "something else" a new statute should have, if Calabresi's doctrine 
is to be distinguished from the approaches he rejects, is consistency with the 
topography. It is not enough to say that the doctrine is desirable because it 
causes legislatures to consider issues that have not been considered for some 
time. This is just what sunsetting does, and Calabresi rejects sunsetting pre-
cisely because it ties reconsideration to a calendar. And it doesn't add 
much to the doctrine to argue that it will tend to select out those statutes 
that are most in need of reconsideration from a "majoritarian sentiment" 
perspective if, as is likely to be the case in practice, a court's perception of 
majority sentiment is blind to the far narrower majoritarian forces that will 
inform the process of reconsideration. Newer is not necessarily better;37 a 
decision that an abstract majority would prefer a different statute is a rather 
poor predicate for sending a statute back into a legislative cauldron that 
might yield up any number of different brews, some savory, some not. And 
even if courts were able to plumb majority sentiment better than legislatures 
on issues that most people have no opinion on one way or the other, the 
deficiencies of the judicial system as a representational arena38 surely cau-
tion against granting courts the power to displace the legislative agenda 
unless some very real gains in terms of consistency with the topography are 
37. And the old law may be better than no law at all, depending on who is left holding the 
power. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & Socv. REV. 95, 139 (1974) (citing study concluding that liberalization of 
censorship law "did not make censorship boards more circumspect; instead, many closed down 
and the old game between censorship boards and distributors was replaced by a new and 
rougher game between exhibitors and local government-private group coalitions"). 
38. That courts attract interest groups which are incapable of achieving their objectives 
through the political process is well known. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-37 (1966). The death penalty cases illustrate that 
devoted advocates are as adept at pressing their cause as lobbyists, see Meltsner, Litigating 
Against the IJeath Penalty: The Strategy Behind Furman, 82 YALE L.J. 1111, 1112 (1973), and 
courts adopting Calabresi's doctrine should expect interests that have lost in the legislature to 
tum to litigation. At a minimum, the doctrines governing standing and intervention would 
have to be reappraised in light of the obvious need for a balanced perspective on the question 
of a statute's obsolescence. 
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likely to result. How likely is the application of the doctrine to produce 
such a result? 
III 
The short answer to that question is: it depends. It depends on how 
the doctrine is applied. In its simplest form, the doctrine would amount to 
no more than remanding a statute - ie., sending it back for legislative 
reconsideration. In other cases, if the courts knew what form a new rule 
should take - what would be consistent with the legal topography - they 
would merely begin to update the statute themselves. Or courts could nul-
lify a law, or some portion thereof, if they were sure that the law was impor-
tant enough that the legislature would reconsider it promptly.39 They could 
borrow statutes from other jurisdictions, if they thought this was appropri-
ate, and they could give all of this retroactive or prospective effect, depend-
ing on what they thought was most likely to elicit legislative response. And 
"[p ]er haps most important, they can do none of these things, but threaten to 
do any or all of them, if a legislature or administrative agency does not act 
quickly. They can shape that legislative or administrative action by an-
nouncing, or by failing to announce, what they will do in the absence of 
such action" (p. 148) (emphasis in original). 
This is dialogue with a vengeance. The aim is "to ask, cajole, or force 
... the legislature ... to define the new rule or reaffirm the old" (p. 166). 
If there are "asymmetries in inertia," courts can properly place the "burden 
of inertia" on the side that can more easily obtain majoritarian considera-
tion of the statute (p. 126); if a recent statute was the "result of inadver-
tence, overreaction to a particular set of events, or a legislative response to a 
temporary majority at war with more persistent social views," courts can 
send it back for reconsideration; if a statute presents "constitutional, 
paraconstitutional, or deep structural doubts" (p. 135) and courts are them-
selves unwilling to invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds, they can 
question whether it might have been "enacted hastily and without the full 
consideration that would suggest more than temporary majoritarian sup-
port" (p. 136). If all of this suggests that courts would be doing more than 
humbly submitting statutes for reconsideration - a vote of confidence if 
you will - the examples Calabresi uses will do little to dispel any doubt 
that he, too, has an agenda. Thus we are informed that "correct use of the 
doctrine may do away with [obsolete] statutes that are themselves a major 
cause of court congestion" (p. 143) by eliminating, for example, "outworn 
compensation laws" that have resulted in the "expensive and court-burden-
ing end run represented by product liability suits" (p. 143). And "crisis 
laws" such as "fair trade" legislation, "emergency rent controls," and 
"emergency malpractice laws that place restrictions on recoveries alien to 
the rest of tort law" which do not find support in the topography are de-
39. The somewhat lax congressional response to the Supreme Court's decision in Northern 
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982), may leave readers 
unsure of when legislation is so "important" that swift reconsideration is certain. See 41 
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 79 (Jan. 8, 1983). See also F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 176 
(1981) (noting wistfully that judicial suggestions for legislative reform are almost always 
ignored). 
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scribed as the "very statutes that most justify the use of the doctrine here 
described" (p. 133). 
Not surprisingly, Calabresi is most comfortable with statutory examples 
he is familiar with, and those with respect to which he has definite opinions. 
The reader is left to guess what the topography might dictate in other areas 
of the law - particularly areas like property and criminal law - that are 
stubbornly state-specific despite centuries of debate over what ends these 
laws should serve and how those ends might best be effected. No matter; 
other scholars can perform the cartography necessary to map these areas. 
Everyone has an agenda. If the current literature on constitutional law 
teaches anything, it is that, and it is hard to shriek "eureka" with much 
feeling anymore when one peels a doctrine bare to find values at the core.40 
And it is difficult to fault the value Calabresi is pursuing, despite whatever 
quibbles one might have with the examples he uses. The value his doctrine 
hews to, after all, is one that goes to the heart of the legislative process: a 
deliberation that is both representative and reasoned.41 
Because Calabresi accepts legislative supremacy, a current legislative 
decision is a representative one. That much, then, is out of the way, despite 
the fact that the majority sentiment portion of the obsolescence inquiry is a 
crude predictor of whether a statute lacks current legislative support and 
despite the fact that the doctrine is blind to laws that "fit" the topography 
but might lack current support. "Reasoned" deliberation is another story. 
Calabresi's suspicion that the legislative process is anything but rea-
soned is manifest throughout the book. He questions whether "one [can] 
truly say that legislatures viewed the [death penalty] issue soberly" in the 
wake of Furman42 (p. 26), and he exhorts courts to use the doctrine to en-
sure that a "clash [with the topography] is the result of genuine and consid-
ered wishes of majoritarian bodies" (p. 136 (emphasis original)), and that 
constitutionally doubtful laws are enacted "clearly, openly and respon-
sibly." In sum, the courts would assume a role that "encourages the legisla-
tures to act responsibly" (p. 165). But if legislative responsibility means an 
end result that is either more consistent with the legal topography or the 
product of a different level of legislative attention, a simple remand of the 
statute is likely to yield neither. 
The reason why simple reconsideration will not necessarily yield greater 
consistency with the. topography hearkens back to the phenomenon oflegis-
lative inertia. Calabresi employs legislative inertia as a setpiece in his anal-
ysis; in his haste to prescribe a cure, he devotes little time to exploring the 
cause of the problem his doctrine addresses. He cites another commentator 
for the proposition that "getting a statute enacted is much easier than get-
40. See Brest, 17ze Fundamental Rights Controversy: 17,e Essential Contradictions of Nor-
mative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, I 109 (1981) ("most of our writings are 
not political theory but advocacy scholarship - amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade 
the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good"). 
41. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 212 (1967) ("Political life is not 
merely the making of arbitrary choices. . . . It is always a combination of bargaining and 
compromise where there are irresolute and conflicting commitments, and common delibera-
tion about public policy, to which facts and rational arguments are relevant."). 
42. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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ting it revised" (p. 6) and proceeds with his analysis.43 But the proposition 
is demonstrably false, as a glance at either a cumulative "table of statutes 
affected" or the statistics on the volume oflegislation - state or federal -
will quickly reveal. Most legislation adds to or amends existing legislation; 
very little tills totally new ground.44 That Calabresi devotes little attention 
to what legislative inertia is, and how it operates, is best illustrated by his 
discussion of the Supreme Court's struggle to _keep the Federal Employer's 
Liability Act abreast of then current tort law by consistently interpreting it 
to allow plaintiffs to get to a jury with their claim: 
One may well ask why Congress did not revise the laws and save the Court 
the trouble. But the reasons, grounded in the complex interplay of interest 
group politics, are of no special significance. Legislative inertia, absent 
Court action, was a fact of life in this area. [P. 34.] 
Far from being "ofno special significance," the "complex interplay of inter-
est group politics" is the very stuff of legislative inertia; and there is little 
reason to suspect that, in most cases, it will be any less a fact of life when a 
statute is bounced back for reconsideration. 
It simply is not plausible to argue that statutes, even very old statutes, 
are negative sum games, imposing useless costs that everyone would simply 
rather do without. They are, instead, most often zero sum games: one 
group's loss is measured by another's gain. They distribute benefits to some 
at the expense of others; those who bear the expense will not hesitate to shift 
their burden if they can make out an argument that they are now the rele-
vant majority. And legislators know, as courts can never know, the peril of 
ignoring such arguments. Once passed, a particular statute often remains in 
force for precisely the same reason it was enacted originally: A small 
number of intensely interested individuals or groups will devote much time, 
effort and money to an issue because they have a much greater stake than 
the public at large in the statutory outcome.45 
Indeed, Calabresi's own examples illustrate this best. The economist 
may know that rent control debilitates housing stock and narrows consumer 
choice, but it is obvious why those laws remain in force. And it is equally 
obvious that neither microeconomic nor macropolicy arguments ("a still 
predominantly 'free price' society" (p. 133)) are likely to dislodge such laws. 
The "emergency" legislation Calabresi is concerned with may be borne of 
crisis, but it creates its own constituency.46 And if the passage oflegislation 
capping recoveries in products liability and medical malpractice suits indi-
43. P. 6 (citing G. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 95). 
44. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Forth, The Assembly Line: Law Production in the American 
Stales, 3 LEGIS. Sruo. Q. 265, 269 (1978) ("Very few [statutes) create policies or programs 
from scratch; most amend existing law. Many add to already substantial regulations. Many 
are local legislation having only limited impact. Only a handful of all those introduced com-
mand widespread interest; not many more provoke intense controversy."). 
45. See Pennock,Anolher Legislative Typology, 41 J. PoL. 1206, 1208-09 (1979) (analyzing 
statutes conferring particularized benefits and exacting generalized costs as unlikely to produce 
either intra-interest group conflict or taxpayer resistance). 
46. The sixty-year-old American antidumping statute, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677 (Supp. II 
1979), is a classic example. In recent years the statute has been most frequently invoked by 
industries that have suffered from competitive imports, see Ehrenhaft, Whal the Anlidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Provisions oJ the Trade Agreements Ac/ /Can] {Wi/g /Should] Mean lo 
U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL. INTL. Bus. 1361, 1364, 1374 (1979) (brackets in original) 
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cates anything, it is that defendants know an "end run" when they see it. 47 
And what of the obsolescence of fair trade laws now, when the latest word 
is that resale price maintenance is no longer taboo?48 The only really good 
example of out-and-out legislative perversity that Calabresi adduces is the 
persistence, in several states, of limitations on wrongful death recoveries. 
But the example is dated, as he concedes, because "[t]his particular problem 
has been remedied by the legislatures" (p. 40). He is correct in pointing out 
that inflation has taken legislatures by surprise (p. 40), but it seems that 
courts have also had a little difficulty with the concept.49 
But all this goes only to reinforcing the point made earlier regarding the 
"mismatch" between the vague majority-sentiment inquiry courts would 
conduct and the rather sharp jumble of majoritarian forces a statute would 
confront upon reconsideration. This mismatch augurs poorly for the pre-
dictive power of the doctrine, to be sure, but it does not militate against 
using the doctrine if one is confident that courts can, and should, redirect 
the legislative agenda. And if we assume that the topographic concept can 
be operationalized in a manner that will persuade legislators as well as the 
courts, it is possible that legislatures might make a concerted effort to recon-
sider those statutes brought to their attention by the courts. 
This is an empirical question; different states will respond in their own 
way to such suggestions. Calabresi notes in passing the existence of law 
revision commissions, but fails to note that many states have committees or 
commissions charged with evaluating the statutory landscape for obsoles-
cence. so Some of these commissions and committees also monitor state 
court decisions, bringing suggestions and criticisms to the attention of the 
relevant legislative committee.51 His doctrine may add some urgency to 
such requests, but the staggering volume of legislation, at least at a state 
level, makes one less than sanguine that legislatures are likely to give a 
more reasoned consideration to an open-ended judicial request for recon-
sideration than they have in the past to the detailed suggestions from their 
(most antidumping cases initiated by steel and chemical industries; cases are "pimples on the 
trade landscape"). 
47. In fact, there has been considerable pressure for a uniform federal law on products 
liability; opposition to date has come, as one might expect, from lawyers. See 51 U.S.L.W. 
2474, 2475-76 (Feb. 15, 1983) (report of Mid-Year Meeting of the American Bar Association) 
(committee reaffirms ABA's opposition to proposed national products liability legislation). 
48. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 288-91 (1978). 
49. See, e.g., Comment, Inflation, Productivity, and the Total Offset Method of Calculating 
Damages far Lost Future Earnings, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1003 (1982); Note,Interest in Judgments 
Against the Federal Government: The Need for Full Compensation, 91 YALE L.J. 297 (1981). 
50. See note 19 supra. 
51. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.065(a)(l-3) (1979 Supp.) (requiring state legislative 
council to "annually examine administrative regulations, published opinions of state and fed-
eral courts and of the Department of Law that rely on state statutes • . . to determine whether 
or not . • . the courts and agencies are properly implementing legislative purposes . . . [, or 
whether] there are court or agency expressions of dissatisfaction with state statutes . . • ~ or 
whether] the opinions or regulations indicate unclear or ambiguous statutes."); if. ALASKA 
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, REPORT OF EXAMINATION OF COURT DECISIONS CONSTRU· 
ING ALASKA STATUTES RENDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA ii (1977) (introduc-
tion of report states that "Part Two consists of cases where the court specifically requests 
legislative guidance on an issue which is unsettled under existing law''). 
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own staff as to how a law - even a fairly picayune law - should be 
modified. 
Calabresi would skirt many of these difficulties, however, by suggesting 
how courts might best promote dialogue between themselves and the legis-
latures. The disadvantages of this, of course, are that if courts assume the 
more active role in this dialogue they risk displacing from the legislative 
agenda other issues that might have been con~idered and they invite a legis-
lative response that will, in time, be no response at all. The first point may 
seem trifling unless one appreciates just how many statutes a typical legisla-
ture considers, and under what sort of constraints it operates.52 Adding a 
"sub-docket" of statutes that courts are troubled by may well leave less time 
for issues that legislatures have addressed because - is it possible? - the 
courts have not.53 Shield laws, legal death statutes and school refinancing 
bills come to mind. The second point, however, is more bothersome. 
Again, a glance at the statistics on state legislation is helpful, if somewhat 
depressing. Whatever problem statutory obsolescence presents now, it is 
sure to grow worse in the future. The well-known tendency of Congress to 
pass the buck to the federal courts through vaguely worded statutes may 
make readers less than comfortable about accepting a doctrine that would 
let legislators comfort themselves with the notion that courts can also decide 
how an old statute should be modified. Then instead of courts telling liti-
gants that they should argue their case to Congress, Congress can tell con-
stituents that they should argue their statute to the courts. 
IV 
There can be no doubt that this book should be read by everyone con-
cerned with the legal process. The scholarly interest that this book has al-
ready produced54 suggests that it will be widely read, if not widely 
accepted. Debate about the role of judges will no doubt continue, and Cal-
abresi's novel theory is likely to become a point of reference. Whatever the 
ultimate merits of Calabresi's doctrine, his lucid and scholarly exposition is 
52. In New York, for example, 21,682 bills were introduced in the 1979-1980 regular ses-
sion; 734 of these bills were enacted into law. And of course there are resolutions - generally 
these are of little moment, but they do take up legislative time. Again, New York leads the 
pack with 1,503 resolutions introduced and 1,408 passed for the 1979 portion of the 1979-1980 
session. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1981 BOOK OF THE STATES 206-7 (Table 13) 
(1982). The SO state average for bills enacted in 1975-1976 was 853, Rosenthal & Forth, There 
Oughtto he A Law!, Sl STATE GoVT. 81 (1978). Although the number of bills introduced in 
state legislature has increased sharply in recent years, see Rosenthal & Forth, supra note 44, at 
272, the number of bills enacted has not increased proportionately. This suggests that many 
legislatures might be functioning at or near institutional limits. 
53. See, e.g., Kurfess, State Legislatures: A Record of Accomplishment, 47 STATE GovT. 
247 (1974) (citing campaign finance reform (40 states), conflict of interest legislation (36 states) 
comprehensive land use planning (12 states), and public financing of education as areas where 
state legislatures had taken policy initiatives.); Legislating .Death, 49 STATE GoVT. 130, 134 
(1976) ("Medical developments over the last several decades have created situations raising 
legal questions which are not adequately resolved by common law or existing statutes. In 
addressing the issues of criteria for the determination of death and guidelines for dealing with 
dying persons state legislatures will face many problems . . . . [T]he need to confront these 
issues . . . is inevitable."). 
54. See note 3 supra. 
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valuable for the light it casts into the misty area which separates legislative 
from judicial functions. 
But Calabresi's doctrine is too big for the small problems, and too small 
for the big problems. The small problems - wrongful death limitations 
and archaic contributory negligence rules - do not justify revamping the 
legislative/judicial balance. For the big problems - those resulting from 
the inherent dynamic of majoritarian politics - provoking legislative re-
consideration of senile statutes is unlikely to produce a more consistent 
body of positive law. 
The failure, however, is not one of vision on Calabresi's part. He is "a 
man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything" and he 
therefore "must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not so 
good."55 Let the people complain to those who make the laws if the laws 
fail to pace the times. Meanwhile, courts ought to keep quiet about the 
subterfuges they use to do justice when someone is caught between a rock 
and a statutory hard place. 
55. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE ch. XV (Modem Library ed. 1968). 
